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Abstract
The existence of homeowner preferences - specifically homeowner preferences for neighbors -
is fundamental to economic models of sorting. This paper investigates whether or not the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) impacted local preferences for Arab neighbors.
We test for changes in preferences using a differences-in-differences approach in a hedonic pricing
model. Relative to sales before 9/11, we find properties within 0.1 miles of an Arab homeowner
sold at a 1.4% discount in the 180 days after 9/11. The results are robust to a number of
specifications including time horizon, event date, distance, time, alternative ethnic groups, and
the presence of nearby mosques. Previous research has shown price effects at neighborhood
levels but has not identified effects at the micro or individual property level, and for good
reason: most transaction level data sets do not include ethnic identifiers. Applying methods
from the machine learning and biostatistics literature, we develop a binomial classifier using a
supervised learning algorithm and identify Arab homeowners based on the name of the buyer.
We train the binomial classifier using names from Summer Olympic Rosters for 221 countries
during the years 1948-2012. We demonstrate the flexibility of our methodology and perform an
interesting counterfactual by identifying Hispanic and Asian homeowners in the data; unlike the
statistically significant results for Arab homeowners, we find no meaningful results for Hispanic
and Asian homeowners following 9/11.
Key Words: house prices, ethnicity, homeowner preferences, terrorism, September 11th
JEL Codes: R21, R23, R31, J15
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Preferences over neighborhood and neighbor characteristics are fundamental to models of economic
sorting. On September 11, 2001 (9/11), 19 terrorists from 4 Arab countries - Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - attacked targets in New York City and Washington DC.
The How Americans Responded (HAR) survey carried out immediately after 9/11 found that the
attacks affected individual preferences for both Arabs and Muslims.1 A majority of respondents in
HAR (70%) viewed African, Hispanic, and Asian Americans as favorable, but less than half of the
respondents (46%) viewed Arabs or Muslims as favorable. Furthermore, in the 30 days after 9/11,
the Anti Defamation League recorded 12 instances of either anti-Arab or anti-Muslim violence.2
This study investigates whether or not the events of 9/11 caused preferences for Arab neighbors to
change, and if these changes were reflected in residential real estate prices.
Using a differences-in-differences approach in a hedonic pricing model, we test this hypothesis
using transactions for single-family homes obtained from the King County Assessor’s Office. King
County is in Washington state and includes the Seattle metropolitan area. We exploit cross-
sectional and temporal variation in sale prices in order to isolate price effects attributable to 9/11.
Our results are both plausible and statistically significant: 1) relative to sales before 9/11, houses
sold 180 days after 9/11 and within 0.1 miles of an Arab neighbor sold at a 1.4% discount, 2) this
effect is temporary as the discount is not statistically significant 180 days after 9/11, and 3) the
effect is not attributable to the presence of nearby mosques. These conclusions are robust across a
wide number of model specifications and identifying alternatives.
Economic research has focused on 2 channels by which economic variables, such as property
prices, can be affected by terrorism: expectations and preferences. In the context of real estate,
the expectations channel is straightforward. Property valuations will decrease following a terrorist
attack if 1) the likelihood of a future terrorist attack increases and 2) a particular piece of real
estate is a realistic target of a terrorist attack. Although HAR indicates that 79% of respondendents
became more concerned of another terrorist attack following 9/11, it is unlikely that individuals
living in single-family homes believed their homes were potential targets of a terrorist attack.3 By
1http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/har/ How Americans Responded is a survey project at the Institute for Social
Research, the University of Michigan. The 613 panel participants in the project were first contacted October 17,
2001 and then re-surveyed April, 16 2002.
2http://archive.adl.org/terrorism_america/adl_responds.html
3This is not to say that all properties are unlikely targets of terrorism as Abadie and Dermisi (2008) find evidence
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using single-family homes in a location more than 3,000 miles from New York City, we preclude
any price effects resulting from the expectations channel.
Static preferences towards Arab neighbors are in line with correspondence experiments that
find landlords discriminate against non-Arabs or non-Muslims, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008)
and Bosch et al. (2010). Similar to Gautier et al. (2009), we use an event study where non-
Arab homeowners initially have arbitrary preferences for their current Arab neighbors, but the
events of 9/11 change these preferences. Because we examine transactions within 0.1 miles of Arab
homeowners, we use neighbor in the geographic sense. We note it would be interesting to perform
an analysis similar to Linden and Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008) where the arrival of an Arab
neighbor post 9/11 impacts property prices. However, given the short-term nature of the price
effects and the small number of Arab homeowners in the data, such an analysis is not possible.4
Of course, a change in preferences towards Arab neighbors does not necessarilly mean that
current homeowners themselves form unfavorable views of Arab neighbors post 9/11. Rather, the
value of the property is also based on expected preferences of potential buyers. Given that less
than half of the respondents in HAR viewed Arabs as favorable, it is not implausible that shortly
after 9/11 transaction prices would reflect the probability that a non-negligible number of potential
buyers would view Arab neighbors unfavorably.5 A limitation of this study is that we cannot
distinguish between the current homeowner and potential buyer channels. In what follows, we
remain agnostic as to the true source of the change in preferences.
Unfortunately, our data set is comparable to many transaction level data sets that do not indi-
cate the ethnicity of the buyer or seller. However, our data set does include the full name (first and
last name) of both the buyer and seller. As such, we identify ethnicity based on an individual’s full
name. Related approaches have been used extensively in the biostatistics literature and are known
as name-ethnicity matching. Gautier et al. (2009) use an informal but pragmatic approach where
of the expectations channel at work in high-rise office buildings. Similarly, homeowners living in high-rise residential
buildings might might form similar expectations. Although Seattle is a major metropolitan area and the assessor’s
data includes condominium transactions in multi-floor buildings, there are too few units and transactions following
9/11 than can be used for this analysis. Furthermore, unlike Abadie and Dermisi (2008), it is not clear what are the
landmark buildings in downtown Seattle. In short, high-rise residential buildings are not the focus in this paper but
a possible avenue for future research.
4The small number of Arabs purchasing home in the 180 days after 9/11 in the assessor data is the primary reason
for this insignificance.
5This can be done using a search model similar to Krainer (2001) where 1) current homeowners receive non-
negative utility from living near a nearby Arab neighbor (Type I), 2) some potential buyers are also Type I, 3)
the remaining potential buyers receive disutility from an Arab neighbor (Type II), and 4) the transaction price is
decreasing in the probability that potential buyers are Type II.
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research assistants from Turkey and Morocco manually identify Turkish and Moroccan names in
20,148 transactions. Given our data set includes 302,065 transactions and we do not have any
Arab research assistants, manually identifying Arab names in the assessor data is neither practi-
cal not feasible. Based on anecdotal evidence, similar situations are common to many economic
researchers.
In order to identify Arab homeowners, we use a supervised learning algorithm common in the
machine learning literature. The idea is to use a labeled data set in order to predict labeling on a
different, unlabeled data set. For the application at hand, we use a binary labeling where countries
are either members of the Arab League or not. We then apply this labeling to the set of Summer
Olympic rosters for all countries 1948-2012. Next, we estimate a binomial classifier (a regularized
or penalized logit) using indicator variables for names as the explanatory variables. Finally, we
use the estimated binomial classifier to label buyer and seller names in the assessor data. In short,
names in the assessor data are labeled based on the conditional likelihood that a given name would
be found on the Olympic roster of an Arab League country.
The supervised learning algorithm we describe provides two advantages over manual classifica-
tion. First, unlike manual classification, our procedure can be scaled to large data sets. In real
estate settings, large data sets are commonplace. Second, our procedure is quite flexible and can
be used to classify individuals by name into any number of groups. As a demonstration of this
flexibility, we perform a falsification test using Asian and Hispanic homeowners and, in contrast to
Arab homeowners, find no significant price effects post 9/11 for either of these two groups.
We focus on preferences for Arab neighbors as a matter of practicality despite results in the
HAR indicating borh Arabs and Muslims were viewed as unfavorable. Because the Arab World is
not the same as the Islamic World, and vice-versa, we compare alternative identification schemes
based on religious and geographic considerations. We also examine countries with large Muslim
populations as well as the countries in the recently proposed US Census racial category: Middle
East and North African (MENA). Including non-Arab countries with a large Muslim population
intensifies the price effect; using MENA countries mitigates the price effect as by definition MENA
is a purely geographic definition that includes Israel but excludes Sudan. As a whole, we interpret
these findings as evidence that homeowner preferences also respond to non-Arab Muslim neighbors.
Of course, automated classification schemes are neither perfect nor perfect substitutes for hu-
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man classifiers. Regardless, in the spirit of Gautier et al. (2009), an independent undergraduate
economics student confirmed the probable ethnicity in a small sample of buyers classified as Arab
in the assessor data. As a whole, the machine learning approach developed here is both a practical
and flexible way to identify unobserved ethnicity using observed names in large data sets.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Terrorism
This study is part of a growing theoretical and empirical literature investigating the relationship
between terrorism and economic variables. Theoretical results focus on how terrorism is different
from other risks. Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2005) demonstrate how terrorism insurance differs from
catastrophe insurance. Becker et al. (2004) examine terrorism in a behavioral model that includes
both fear and risk aversion. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) compare the impacts of war and terrorism
on the formation and dissolution of urban centers and find war has had a larger impact on urban
formation than terrorism.
Despite the low probability of a terrorist event, there does appear to be significant empirical
evidence that terrorism has a large impact on macroeconomic variables. In one of the earliest stud-
ies, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find terrorism in the Basque region of Spain decreased regional
per capita GDP by a non-trivial 10%. Examples of other economic variables affected by terrorism
include stock markets Zussman and Zussman (2006) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), foreign
direct investment Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), consumption Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), in-
dustrial organization Berrebi and Klor (2010), birth weight Camacho (2008), vacancy rates Abadie
and Dermisi (2008), and house prices Besley and Mueller (2012) and Elster et al. (2017). Of course,
these economic costs are in addition to any non-economic costs associated with a decrease in quality
of life, Frey et al. (2007).
Implicit in these studies are the beliefs that economic agents have about the probability of future
terrorism. These beliefs are updated after the realization of relevant events. For instance, Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) find violence that the stock market reacts positively when a credible truce is
reached. Zussman and Zussman (2006) and Zussman et al. (2008) find that the Israeli stock market
reacts in response to key events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Using a regime-switching model,
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Besley and Mueller (2012) find there is a difference between short-term violence and long-term
perceptions of persistent violence in Northern Ireland; only when homeowners perceive that the
world is in a non-violent state do regional house price indexes trend upwards. Abadie and Dermisi
(2008) find vacancy rates in notable Chicago office buildings increased in the months following 9/11.
2.2 Preferences and the Real Estate Market
This study is also related to other studies that find preferences for neighbors are correlated with
socioeconomic variables. Using US Census microdata, Bayer et al. (2004) find race is a fundamental
cause of sorting in the San Francisco Bay area. Other studies suggest preferences of natives for
non-immigrant neighbors can lead to segregation, Cutler et al. (2008) and Benabou (1993). Saiz
and Wachter (2011) find house prices metropolitan areas with more immigration grow faster, but
house prices neighborhoods with a higher concentration of immigrants grow more slowly relative
to the metropolitan area at large. Saiz and Wachter (2011) suggest one interpretation is that
natives prefer native neighbors. That being said, Bayer et al. (2007) find price effects attributable
to race can be misleading when neighborhood quality is not observed. As a whole, these studies
find evidence that homeowners prefer neighbors with common social, racial, linguistic, and ethnic
identities. We build on these studies and ask if preferences for ethnicity are static, or if preferences
respond to acts of terrorism.
Several studies have used correspondence experiments to test for discrimination against Arabs
and Muslims in the real estate market. Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) find landlords in Sweden
are less willing to respond to rental applications when the applicant’s name is strongly associated
with Islam or Arab ethnicity. Using applicant names Erik Johansson, Maria Andersson and Mo-
hammed Rashid, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) find emails sent using the name Mohammed
Rashid received fewer callbacks and invitations to view the property. In a similar experiment in
Spain, Bosch et al. (2010) find the low response rate still exists after controlling for socioeconomic
factors. Using hand-written applications, Carpusor and Loges (2006) find similar evidence of dis-
crimination in the American rental market. Overall, these findings are not unlike the experiences
of other minorities in rental markets, Hanson and Hawley (2011). By construction, in all of these
correspondence experiments, the ethnicity of the applicant is signaled by name and name alone.
In addition to cross-sectional studies, event studies have also been used to test for changing
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attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims at the neighborhood level. Gautier et al. (2009) investigate
property prices following the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a recent convert to rad-
ical Islam. Following van Gogh’s murder, listing prices in nearby Muslim neighborhoods decreased
by 3%. Further, Gautier et al. (2009) find evidence of increasing segregation after the murder as
Muslims became more likely to purchase homes in areas with an already large concentration of
Muslims. Similar results at the neighborhood level are found following London subway bombings,
Ratcliffe and von Hinke Kessler Scholder (2015). The results in (Gautier et al., 2009) and Ratcliffe
and von Hinke Kessler Scholder (2015) are best interpreted as the effect of terrorism on home prices
in nearby Muslim neighborhoods. In contrast, we are interested in local impacts at the property
level in neighborhoods that do not necessarily have a clustering of Arab homeowners. Furthermore,
Seattle is more than 3,000 miles from New York and Washington DC and was not a target of any
terrorism on 9/11.
2.3 Name-Ethnicity Matching
In order to estimate our binomial classifier, we use a hierarchical data generating process common in
the text modeling literature. In these models, words in a body of text are assumed to be drawn from
a multinomial distribution where the probability of each word is drawn from one or more topics,
Hofmann (1999), Blei et al. (2003). For example, in the economics literature, texts with urban
topics are more likely to include the words residential, and rental, whereas texts with international
topics are more likely to include tariff and trade. In this study, the first and last name of each
Olympian (words) are viewed as realizations from a multinomial distribution where the probability
of each name is a function of the Olympian’s ethnicity (topic).
Automated approaches for matching name to race or ethnicity, name-ethnicity matching, have
been well studied in the biostatistics literature. Examples include Coldman et al. (1988), Burchard
et al. (2003), Fiscella and Fremont (2006). Moreover, examples where the researcher generates
names from a given ethnicity are common in correspondence experiments in economics, Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004), Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008), Bosch et al. (2010), Hanson and Hawley
(2011), Hanson et al. (2016). Applications where real names are used to infer ethnicity include
Humphreys et al. (2016) and Gautier et al. (2009).
A standard econometric approach to creating a binomial classifier based on observables is to use
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a logit or similar binary choice model. In the name-ethnicity approach, the number of observables
(names) can be large. In this high-dimensional covariate setting, maximum likelihood estimation
will overfit the data and out-of-sample predictions are at best misleading, Hastie et al. (2015). Out-
of-sample performance is of critical importance to us as our primary goal is predicting ethnicity
in the assessor data. Noting this, we use an `1 regularized estimator. This regularization yields
an estimator that has been shown to have superior out-of-sample performance in high-dimensional
logistic models relative to both un-regularized estimators and `2 regularized estimators, Ng (2004).
Furthermore, unlike manual classification, the classifier can be scaled to large data sets.
We estimate the binomial classifier by first labeling the Olympians as either representing an
Arab League country or not. By using labeled data, we use a supervised learning algorithm.
An alternative when the research has no ex-ante knowledge of groups is to identify latent ethnic
groups by applying an unsupervised learning algorithm on an unlabeled set of names. One of the
more popular unsupervised learning algorithms in textual analysis is the Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA), Blei et al. (2003). Similar to principal components, it is necessary for the researcher to label
or identify the ex-post estimated LDA topics. In unreported results, we find that the LDA resulted
in a group that could most likely be identified as an Arab League group. In any event, because we
are interested in classifying based on ex-ante, specified groups, we leverage this specificity and use
the supervised learning algorithm described below.
3 Identifying Ethnicity and the Binomial Classifier
In what follows we use the following definitions: a full name is a first name and last name pair, and
a name is either a first name or a last name. We treat each full name as an exchangeable set of
names: one or more first and last names.6 For example, American Olympian carl lewis is expressed
as the 2-element set {carl, lewis}. In our analysis, we treat hyphenated names as two names and
retain the hyphen in order to acknowledge the split. For example, French Olympian jean-claude
killy becomes the 3 element set {jean-, claude, killy}, and Syrian Olympian nasser al-shami is the
3-element set {nasser, al-, shami}. We also remove diacritics from the full names in a practical
manner as josé becomes jose. In the Olympic rosters, we identify 69,648 unique names. In order to
6Viewing the names in this was is common in the textual analysis literature and is known as a tokenization
approach where each name is a token. Examples of the tokenization approach to text data include Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2010), Taddy (2013), and Nowak and Smith (2017).
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focus on the more frequent names, we drop all names that occur fewer than 10 times in the rosters.
Doing so leaves P = 3, 212 unique names.7
As mentioned above, we use indicator variables for names as the explanatory variables in a logit
model. That being said, it is instructive to view each full name as a P × 1 vector, xn, of 1s and
0s where the p element is equal to 1 if name p is in the full name of Olympian n and 0 otherwise.
For carl lewis, xn has 2 elements with a 1, and the remaining elements are 0: the pth element of
xn, xnp, corresponding to carl will be equal to 1 and likewise for lewis. Because we view first and
last names as exchangeable variables, our estimator does not distinguish carl lewis from lewis carl.
However, such distinctions are unlikely to have a material impact on our estimator. Moreover, the
exchangeability assumption is also practical as first and last names are not explicitly identified in
the assessor data.
Next, we set the indicator variable yn = 1 if an Olympian comes from an Arab country and 0
otherwise. In order to identify Arab countries, we use the list of countries in the Arab League in
addition to other lists described in more detail. Using yn and xn, one could estimate a logit model
where the explanatory variables are indicator variables for each of the P names. The probability
that yn = 1 is then given by








In Equation (1), when 0 < φp, the presence of name p increases the likelihood that Olympian n
represents a country that is a member of the Arab League, and vice-versa for φ < 0. When φp = 0,
name p does not help to predict yn. The parameter φ0 controls the unconditional Pr(yn = 1).
For fixed P , φp can be consistently estimated by maximum likelihood. In our application, the
assumption of fixed P is difficult to defend as P is large by conventional standards even after
filtering out the least common names in the Olympic rosters. As such, a maximum likelihood
estimation of φ is at worst infeasible when the data is seperable or at best prone to overfit the data,
Hastie et al. (2015).8 Of course, we could increase the cutoff, exclude more names, and reduce
the number of explanatory variables. However, such an approach is imprudent as names that are
removed might be relevant for classification.
7In unreported results, we found that a cutoff of 5 produced similar results to a cutoff of 10.
8In this setting, the data set is separable if any name is only present a single group, i.e. jose is only found in the
non-Arab League rosters. Hastie et al. (2015) provides further details on separable data sets.
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Therefore, we retain a large set of names - large P - and use a regularized likelihood estimator.









Define the solution to Equation 2 as φ∗. The first term in Equation 2 is the negative likelihood of the
sample using the individual likelihood given in Equation 1. The second term is an `1 penalty term
that regularized the magnitudes of the elements in φ. The parameter λ is a tuning parameter.910
When λ = 0, there is no penalty on φ, and φ∗ is the maximum likelihood estimator for the
logit. When 0 < λ, φ∗ is well-defined even for separable data sets. Because of the shape of the
`1 penalty, some entries of φ
∗ can be set equal to 0 when 0 < λ. As mentioned above, when
φ∗p = 0, name p cannot be used to classify yn. With this interpretation, minimizing Equation 2
simultaneously performs variable selection and coefficient estimation. In any event, by including
the penalty term λ
∑
p |φp|, φ∗ can be used to classify names out-of-sample as, unlike the maximum
likelihood estimator, a regularized estimator is less likely to overfit the data in-sample, Ng (2004).
Furthermore, this functional form for the penalty term has been shown to yield superior out-of-
sample prediction compared to an `2 penalty, Ng (2004). We emphasize, out-of-sample performance
is fundamental to our results.
4 Model Specification
In order to test for changes in the local valuation of Arab neighbors, we use a difference-in-differences
approach and compare a control and treatment group before and after 9/11. The two groups are
defined using distance to the nearest Arab homeowner. As such, properties located 0-0.1mi (0.1-
0.3mi) from an Arab neighbor are in the treatment (control) group; these cutoffs are validated,
below. Properties further than 0.3mi from an Arab homeowner are neither in the treatment nor
control group. To the extent that the events of 9/11 were unexpected, we interpret the results as
causal: if not for 9/11, there would be no local price effects attributable to Arab neighbors. Of
9In our analysis, we select λ using 5 fold cross-validation. The results are robust to λ near the cross-validated
choice of λ
10We use the glmnet package in R to solve Equation 2. The solution is found by using a quadratic approximation
to the true regularized likelihood.
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course, given the singular nature of these events, it is not fair to generalize the results to generic
terrorist events.
In order to identify relevant distance thresholds, we first estimate a base hedonic model for
property n in census tract c sold in quarter t
pnct = xnctβ + δct + unct (3)
Here, pnct is the log price of the house, xnct is a vector of house attributes including log square
footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and age of the property, β is a vector of implicit prices, δct is a
census tract specific price at time t, and unct is an error term. We begin each quarter on the 11th
of March, June, September, and December. In doing so, the immediate effects of 9/11 are captured
by only a single δct for a given c.
We determine the distance cutoff for the treatment group using a method similar to Linden and
Rockoff (2008). After estimating Equation 3, we collect the residuals for all transactions located
within 0.3mi of an Arab homeowner. We then estimate a local polynomial regression in order to
estimate the price gradient as a function of distance from the nearest Arab neighbor.11 The 95%
confidence interval for the local polynomial using transactions 180 days before 9/11 is presented
in green in Figure 1. Point estimates for the same local polynomial regression 180 days after 9/11
are presented as a red line in Figure 1.12 If the events of 9/11 caused local preferences for Arab
neighbors to change, the changes are extremely local as the point estimates are within the pre-9/11
95% confidence interval beyond 0.1mi. In any event, Figure 1 suggests a cutoff of 0.1mi for the
treatment group.
We create the indicator variable D0.1nct = 1 (D
0.3
nct = 1) if any Arab neighbor is currently living
within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of the property at time t and 0 otherwise. As further described below, we
use buyer and seller names for all transactions between the years 1982-2016 in order to identify the
current homeowner. In the absence of any time-varying treatment effects, cross-sectional differences
between the control and treatment groups can be estimated using




0.3 + δct + unct (4)
11Similar to Linden and Rockoff (2008), we estimate a local polynomial of order 3 and use a bandwidth of 0.1
nearest-neighbors using the locfit package in R.
12A similar plot is produced when using all sales before 9/11 and sales 365 days before 9/11.
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In Equation 4, ψ0.3 captures local cross-sectional price effects common to all properties within 0.3
miles of an Arab homeowner. Cross-sectional differences include both arbitrary preferences for race
and ethnicity as well as local amenities and neighborhood quality. The coefficient ψ0.1 captures
cross-sectional differences in price between the control and treatment groups. When ψ0.1 > 0
(ψ0.1 < 0), properties in the treatment group sell at a premium (discount) to properties in the
control group. Figure 2 displays the treatment and control group for a randomly selected house.
In the absence of time-varying effects, boundary effects, or detailed data on race and ethnicity,
it is difficult if not impossible to disentangle race and ethnicity preferences from local amenity
effects, Bayer et al. (2007). We follow Pope (2008) and Linden and Rockoff (2008) and test for
time-varying price effects attributable to Arab neighbors by comparing prices between the control
and treatment groups before and after 9/11. As mentioned above, we are interested in investigating
whether or not 9/11 caused perceptions of Arab neighbors to change in a negative way. In order
to test this, we create the indicator variable Postnct = 1 if the transaction occurred after 9/11 but
before March 10, 2002, a time period of 180 days. We later investigate 180-365 days following and
0-180 days before 9/11. For all of these event windows, we estimate




0.3 + Postnct ×D0.1nctτ0.1 + Postnct ×D0.3nctτ0.3 + δt + µc + unct (5)
Here, τ0.1 and τ0.3 capture time-varying price effects relative to the location of Arab neighbors
following 9/11. If τ0.3 < 0, properties within 0.3 miles of Arab neighbors experienced price declines
relative to the rest of the market. If the events of 9/11 caused homeowners’ preferences towards
Arab neighbors to change, price effects should be stronger the closer the property is to an Arab
neighbor, τ0.1 < 0.
5 Data
5.1 Name Ethnicity Data
Data used in this paper comes from two sources. The first source is the set of Summer Olympic
rosters from 1948 to 2012. These rosters were downloaded from the Olympic Reference website.13
13http://www.sports-reference.com/olympics/
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Each roster includes the full name of the Olympian, age, gender and nationality. As mentioned
above, we label countries as Arab if the country is a member of the Arab League. Six member states
formed the Arab League in 1945: Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq. However, the
Arab League has expanded over the years and now includes 22 member states that cover Northern
Africa and the Middle East. We use the 22 member roster of Arab League nations. A complete
list of these countries and other country lists is presented in the sppendix. Table 1 shows the 20
most frequent names from the Arab and non Arab League countries. Figure 3 presents the names
in a word cloud where the size of the font is associated with a greater frequency of the name within
group.
We also investigate alternative lists of countries in order to better interpret and validate
our results. First, we include countries with a large number and percentage of Muslim citizens
(Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey) alongside Arab League countries. Second, we
include countries in the proposed MENA racial category from US Census. The MENA country
list notably includes Israel but excludes Arab League members Somalia and Sudan. Therefore,
using the MENA country list places more of an emphasis on geography than ethnicity. It should
be pointed out that the US Census also considers an ethnic-based definition of MENA using self-
reported ethnic identifiers including Arab, Berber, Kurdish, Middle Eastern, and others.
Other publicly available data sets have been used by resarchers to identify ethnicity including
Wikipedia Treeratpituk and Giles (2012) and IMDB Rachevsky and Pu (2011).14 We use the Sum-
mer Olympic data set in lieu of these other data sets as the Summer Olympic data set 1) provides
a sufficient number of observations for the training set and 2) the number of individuals from Arab
League countries is significantly larger in the Summer Olympic data than in the Wikipedia or
IMDB data. In total, there are N = 90, 636 unique Olympians from 221 unique countries.
5.2 Pricing Data
Transaction data for single-family homes comes from the King County Assessor’s Office that in-
cludes the Seattle metro area.15 The data set is publicly available and includes information on
property attributes, buyer and seller names, transaction price, and other relevant information. We
14The authors are not aware of any publicly available databases provided by Wikipedia. Databases on actors,
directors, etc. provided by IMDB and are available at http://www.imdb.com/interfaces
15http://www.kingcounty.gov/depts/assessor.aspx
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filter out outlying observations using reasonable filters described in the appendix. In order to ex-
clude any effects attributable to the volatility of housing prices in the mid 2000s, we limit our data
set to transactions between January 1, 1982 and December 31, 2002. This leaves 302,065 total
transactions in the study.
Using December 31, 2002 as a cutoff provides us with more than 15 months of sales post 9/11
that we can use to identify time-varying price effects. Summary statistics for the data are provided
in Table 2. The average transaction price is $217,418. The average house has 1,960 square feet, 3.3
bedrooms, 1.5 bathrooms, and was built in 1965. Although using data back to 1982 might seem
excessive, our results are not sensitive to this starting date. In the appendix, we show that our
results do not change substantially when using the sub-periods 1990-2002 or 2000-2002.
It is important to note that we first identify the locations of current homeowners at any point in
time using the entire set of buyer and seller names for all transactions between the years 1982-2016.
For example, an Arab homeowner who buys in 1990 and sells in 1995 would be the current owner
between these years. As a result, all sales between 1990-1995 for any properties located within
0.1mi of this Arab homeowner would have D0.1 = 1.
In addition to using buyer names, we also use seller names to identify Arab homeowners. For
instance, an Arab homeowner who buys a home in 1980 and sells in 2010 would never appear as a
buyer in the set of transactions 1982-2016. However, this individual would appear as a seller in 2010.
Absent this considerations, sub-period analysis using the years 2000-2002 would only include the
locations of Arab homeowners who purchased a property between January 1, 2000 and December
31, 2002. In short, we identify the locations of all Arab homeowners regardless of whether or not the
transaction occurred during the relevant sub-period. Because our data covers more than 30 years
of transaction data, we consider any bias attributable to unobserved Arab homeowners negligible.
Using the binomial classifier, we identify the locations of 494 Arab homeowners between 1982
and 2002. This implies 0.17% of homeowners are of Arab ancestry and is comparable to the 2000 US
Census where 0.4% of the King County population has Arab ancestry.16 A sample of the locations
of homeowners identified as Arab on 9/11 are displayed in Figure 4. Unlike Gautier et al. (2009),
the locations of Arab homeowners are fairly dispersed throughout Seattle. Although the data is
publicly available, for privacy purposes, we do not disclose the actual names of the individuals who
16https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF
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are identified as Arab. A list of the homeowners identified as Arab is available from the authors
upon request. Table 3 displays the total number of observations in the control and treatment groups
before and after 9/11. There are 7,320 transactions in the treatment group with 445 transactions
occurring between 0 and 180 days after 9/11. Likewise, there are 35,768 transactions in the control
group with 2,488 transactions between 0 and 180 days after 9/11.
Table 4 compares control variables in the control group to control variables in treatment group.
Mean comparison tests indicate that the treatment group differs from the control group in a sta-
tistically significant but economically insignificant manner. Figure 5 displays the distribution of
the control variables for the 2 groups. Similar to the evidence in Table 4, the distributions for the
control and treatment groups are similar, although a greater portion of properties in the treatment
group are built after 1985.
6 Results
6.1 Arab Name Identifiers
Results for the regularized logit model are presented in Table 5. As expected, the results in Table
5 indicate that relative frequency in Table 1 is a strong indicator of nationality. Names that are
strong indicators of being from a country in the Arab League or not are as expected. The strongest
predictor of non-Arab status is jose.
It is interesting to note that the most common Arabic name, mohamed, and its variants are
not strong predictors of an individual being from an Arab League country. This should not be
surprising, as mohamed is a both an Islamic and Arab name found throughout many non-Arab
countries. Results in Table 5 do not imply that mohamed should not be used to signify an Arab or
Mulsim applicant as in Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) or Bosch et al. (2010). Rather, Table 5
indicates which names are the strongest predictors but does not display which names would have
the most influence on landlords.
We also find that predictions from our method would be comparable to other classifiers used
in the literature. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) identify distinctively black names using the
relative frequency of names between racial groups (black or white); distinctively black names are
names with the largest ratio of relative frequencies. Figure 6 plots φ∗ against the log of the ratio
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of relative frequencies for Arab and non-Arab countries for all names that occur at least once in
both sets. The positive relationship between φ∗ and the log ratio confirms the notion that a ratio-
based method similar to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) would yield similar classifications to
the binomial classifier we describe above.
Using φ∗ and Equation 1, we can calculate Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ∗) for buyer and seller names in the
assessor data. Unlike Gautier et al. (2009), we do not have access to an Arab research assistant.
However, a manual inspection of the names by an Arab undergraduate economics student confirmed
probable ethnicity for names above this cutoff. Based on manual inspection, we create the indicator
variable Arab = 1 for Arab homeowners if 0.35 < Pr(yn = 1|Xn, φ∗) and Arab = 0 otherwise. In
the Appendix, we present similar results when using a cutoff of 0.5.
6.2 Common Trends
Figure 7 presents the quarterly price index for the control, treatment, and all sales 12 quarters
before 9/11 and 4 quarters after 9/11. The price index uses the convention that quarters being on
the 11th of March, June September, and December, and uses t = 0 for the period June 12, 2001 -
September 10, 2001; t = 1 corresponds to the period September 11, 2001 - December 10, 2001.
Figure 7 presents graphical evidence that property prices in the treatment and control groups
followed a common trend. In unreported results, we can not reject the null hypothesis that the
price indexes for the control and treatment groups follow a different linear time trend for t ≤ 0.
In t = 1, there appears to be a notable decrease in the treatment group price index relative to the
control group price index. For 2 ≤ t, the price indexes for the control and treatment groups appear
to return to their pre 9/11 relationship.
6.3 Price Effects
Table 6 presents our first set of results. All standard errors are clustered two ways at the quarter and
census tract levels. The first column estimates Equation 5 using additively separable census tract
and quarter fixed effects. Additively separable fixed effects preclude heterogeneous price trends
across census tracts. In the cross-section, properties in the treatment group sell at a 1.1% discount
relative to properties in the control group. In the 180 days after 9/11, properties in the treatment
group sell at a 1.8% discount relative to the control group. These results indicate a short-term,
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local, negative price effect attributable to Arab neighbors caused by the events of 9/11 possibly
caused by a change in underlying preferences.
Results in Column 2 include interaction terms between the census tract and quarter fixed effects
and control for heterogeneous price trends across census tracts. As expected, cross sectional effects
attributable to Arab neighbors do not change much but the time-varying effects do change. Unlike
the results in Column 1, after controlling for heterogeneous census tract price trends, there is no
significant difference in price between properties in the control and treatment groups pre 9/11.
However, similar to results in Column 1, there is significant statistical evidence of local price effects
related to Arab neighbors post 9/11. Relative to the control group, properties in the treatment
group sold at a 1.4% discount. The result is significant at the 1% level.
In order to estimate a price effect absent any comparison to properties in the control group
but instead relative to all properties in the market, Column 3 uses D03(1 −D0.1) instead of D0.3
in Equation 5. In contrast to the other columns in the table, the coefficient on D0.1 × Post is
now interpreted as the price effect relative to all properties in the market. The coefficient for D0.1
indicates properties in the treatment groups decreases 2.7% relative to the rest of the market in
the 180 days after 9/11.
Column 4 tests for longer-term price effects by defining Post = 1 if the transaction is 180-
365 days after 9/11 and Post = 0 otherwise. In contrast to the results in Column 2, there is no
significant price difference in the control and treatment groups. Comparing the results in Columns
2 and 4, if 9/11 changed preferences for Arab neighbors, these changes were short-term. We further
investigate the time decay, below.
In our discussion of common trends, we did not reject the null hypothesis that the control
and treatment groups have a common linear price trend. However, it is possible that the results in
Columns 1-3 reflect short-term momentum from unobserved price trends specific to properties in the
treatment group. Alternatively, price effects in Columns 1-3 might not be caused by 9/11 but reflect
existing, short-term price trends immediately before 9/11. In order to rule out this possibility, we
use Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days before 9/11 and Post = 0 otherwise.17 Doing so, we
test for abnormal price effects between March 12, 2001 and September 10, 2001. Results indicate
no evidence that the results in Columns 1-3 are driven by any short-term momentum in the market.
17We avoid using the term Pre = 1 in order to keep the tables concise.
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More importantly, there is no significant difference between the treatment and control groups 180
days before 9/11. In conclusion, the results in Column 5 rule out any momentum effects present in
the treatment group.
6.4 Alternative Model Specifications
Table 7 presents results for alternative model specifications. For reference, we reproduce the results
in Column 2 of Table 6 in Column 1 of Table 7. Column 2 of Table 7 eliminates all sales greater
than 0.5 miles from an Arab homeowner. We do this in order to remove any possible systematic
difference between properties near Arab homeowners and properties much further away. The results
in Column 2 for the 89,049 transactions less than 0.5 miles from an Arab homeowner are comparable
to results using all 302,065 transactions.
Previous results assume that the control variables enter linearly into the regression function.
Column 3 provides a robustness check of this assumption and allows for a flexible relationship
between sale price and square footage, bedrooms, and bathrooms. In Column 3, we sort properties
into bins based on square footage where the bins are 0-500sqft, 500-1,000sqft, etc. up to 4,500-
5,000sqft. We then include indicator variables for the bins as explanatory variables in lieu of a
continuous measure of log square footage. We also include indicator variables for bedrooms and
bathrooms. Results in Column 3 are comparable to the results when using a linear specification
for the control variables.
Column 4 investigates if the price effect attributable to Arab neighbors post 9/11 is more
intense at smaller distances within the treatment group. In order to do so, we create the variable
0.1−Distance
0.1 where Distance is the distance to the closest Arab homeowner in miles. The product
D0.1 × 0.1−Distance0.1 is constrained to be between 0 and 1 and assumes a linear relationship between
proximity to Arab neighbors and price. D0.1 × 0.1−Distance0.1 = 1 when Distance = 0 and D
0.1 ×
0.1−Distance
0.1 = 0 when 0.1 ≤ Distance. Results in Column 4 of Table 7 indicate that none of the
coefficients pre 9/11 are statistically different from 0 for the control and treatment groups.
The coefficient on D0.1× 0.1−Distance0.1 ×Post is statistically different from 0 and equal to −0.047;
thus, estimated price effects attributable to Arab neighbors in the treatment group appear to be
entirely captured by distance. This is not too surprising given Figure 1. Taken in conjunction
with the null result for the coefficient on D0.1 × Post, properties located immediately next to an
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Arab neighbor, Distance = 0, sold at a 4.7% discount relative to the control group. A property
0.05mi away (approximately 264ft) is expected to sell at a 2.35% price discount. Of course, it is not
possible for single-family, detached properties to be immediately next to each other. Regardless,
Column 4 provides evidence that the price effects for Arab neighbors post 9/11 are decreasing in
distance and supports the notion that non-Arab homeowners are reacting to Arab neighbors.
Price trends in Figure 7 presents evidence that the price effect is transitory. Column 5 investi-
gates the speed at which prices return to pre 9/11 relationships. In order to do so, we include the
number of days singe 9/11 divided by 180. This ratio is equal to 0 on 9/11 and increases to a value
of 1 180 days after 9/11. Results in Column 5 indicate that post 9/11, the treatment group saw
a price decline of 2.1% relative to the control group. However, this price effect decays over time.
180 days after 9/11, price effects in the treatment group have increased by 1.4% compared to their
initial 2.1% levels. Alternatively, approximately 2/3 of the initial price effects have disappeared
180 days after 9/11. Of course, these time effects do not take into account any lags associated with
listing the property. Absent any listing data from Multiple Listing Services or similar databases,
it is not possible to determine the exact date a property was listed. In any event, the results in
Column 5 present suggestive evidence that price effects attributable to Arab neighbors attenuated
over time.
Because the events of 9/11 occur at the beginning of Q4, it is possible that the results above
are possible are merely capturing seasonal effects. In order to rule this out, Column 6 of Table 7
includes seasonal fixed effects for the quarter of sale. The results are comparable to Columns 1-3.
Thus, it does not appear that our results are driven by a seasonal effect.
6.5 Alternative Ethnic Groups
We can use the binomial classifier and the Olympic data to classify individuals based on any list
of countries. In order to demonstrate this flexibility, and perform an interesting counterfactual,
we identify homeowners from East Asian and Hispanic countries and perform the same analysis.
For the East Asian list we use: China, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and North Korea. For the
Hispanic group, we use all countries in Central and South America. Preliminary results for these
two groups is presented in Figure 8. As expected, and unlike Figure 1, there does not appear to be
any local price effects for either East Asian or Hispanic neighbors.
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Formal results are presented in Table 8 for East Asian and Hispanic neighbors; complete results
for both East Asian and Hispanic neighbors are presented in the appendix. In contrast to the price
effects for Arab neighbors reported in Column 1, Columns 2 and 3 indicate that there does not
appear to be any price effects associated with either Eat Asian or Hispanic neighbor types in the
180 days post 9/11. Alternatively, changing preferences post 9/11 were very acute and limited to
Arab neighbors. These results are in line with survey results from the HAR where views of Asian
and Hispanic groups were not affected by the events of 9/11.
Results for Arab neighbors rely on using countries in the Arab League as a means to identify
Arab homeowners. Of course, this identification scheme is not without its flaws and limitations.
First and foremost, we emphasize that we estimate effects with respect to Arab neighbors and not
Muslim neighbors. The Islamic World is not homogeneous and its 1.6 billion members come from
various denominations, ethnic groups, and more than 200 countries, Miller (2009). However, Islam
is the dominant religion in Arab League countries with a majority of Muslims in these countries
being either Sunni or Shia. Noting this, we expand our set of countries to include the Arab League
countries as well as countries with a significantly large number and percentage of Muslim citizens:
Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Iran.18 We exclude India as the number of Indian
Muslims is large but constitutes only 13.4% of the total Indian population.
Results when using this expanded list of countries are presented in Column 4 of Table 8. Com-
pared to the results using only the Arab League countries, results when including non-Arab, Muslim
countries indicate a much larger price effect. Compared to the control group, the treatment group
experienced price declines of 3.2%. This price effect is more than twice than the 1.4% price effect
when using the Arab League countries, alone. Of course, this expanded list of countries is by no
means a definitive list of Muslim countries in much the same way the resulting list of Olympians is
by no means a definitive list of Muslim names. Rather, this expanded list of countries is designed
to incorporate additional names that are predominantly Muslim thereby expanding our results to
both Arab and non-Arab Muslims. Regardless, results in Column 4 of Table 8 suggest price effects
post 9/11 are applicable to many members of the Muslim World and not only Arab Muslims.
Indeed, we acknowledge the concept of ethnicity is by no means restricted to geographic de-
fitions. Previous research by the US Census has used both country of origin and self-reported
18http : //www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/Muslimpopulation.pdf
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ethnicity (Arabic, Kurdish, or Berber) in forming a definition of Arab, Asi and Beaulieu (2013).
Presumably for practical purposes, other studies rely on geography as a basis for identification,
Gautier et al. (2009), Bosch et al. (2010). We demonstrate the appropriateness of our Arab League
choice by comparing our results to a strictly geographic definition: the MENA category proposed
by the US Census.19
Results using countries in the MENA category are presented in Column 5 of Table 8. The price
effect is mildly significant and less than both the the Arab League only results and the Arab League
with additional Muslim country results.20 One possible interpretation of these weaker results is
that the notion of geography is explicit in the MENA category. As such, MENA countries include
various ethnic and religious groups. Notably, the MENA category includes Israel. For the study
at hand, the strict geographic requirements present in the list of MENA countries erroneously
includes a number of Jewish individuals in both the treatment and control groups. As such, results
in Column 5 are understandable as the HAR indicates Americans did not for unfavorable views of
Jewish Americans post 9/11.
6.6 Mosques
Unlike Gautier et al. (2009), Figure 4, indicates that there does not appear to be an area of Seattle
where Arab homeowners are concentrated. We present additional evidence using methods in Du-
ranton and Overman (2005) for purchases by Arab homeowners before and after 9/11.21 Duranton
and Overman (2005) use the distribution of pairwise distance as a measure of agglomeration; here,
we use the distribution as a measure of clustering by Arab homeowners. Figure 9 presents the
distribution of pairwise distances between purchases by Arab homeowners before and after 9/11.
As seen in Figure 9, we find no evidence of clustering as the pairwise distances are within the 95%
confidence interval in both periods.
Although there is no significant evidence that Arab homeowners live in concentrated areas, it
is possible that some Arab homeowners choose to live near mosques or Islamic centers. If that is
true, it is possible that estimated price effects reflect a mosques or Islamic centers effect and not an
19https : //www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/press− kits/2017/2015nctpresentationjones.pdf
20p-value=0.056
21The Duranton and Overman (2005) statistic is calculated as the empirical probability mass function for all
pairwise distances, dij , for all i, j = 1, ..., I pairs of members in a subgroup (here, Arab homeowners) of I individuals.
We use a probability mass function as we bin all pairwise distances at 0.25mi for smoothing purposes. The 95%
confidence interval is calculated using 2,000 random draws of properties.
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Arab neighbor effect. This proposition is not outlandish, as Bogin (2012) find prices near mosques
in Baltimore, MD decline 17% after 9/11. In order to rule out the effects of mosques and Islamic
centers, we include similar cross-sectional and time-varying indicators in the estimating equation.
We identify 23 mosques or Islamic centers in the Assessor data that we believe to be in existence
before 9/11.22
Table 9 presents the results when including the mosques and Islamic center indicators. The
price effects attributable to Arab neighbors in Table 9 are comparable to our previously reported
results. In contrast to Bogin (2012), we find no significant mosques or Islamic centers effect when
allowing for heterogeneous price trends across census tracts. However, we do find large mosques
and Islamic center effects when using additively separable fixed tract and quarter fixed effects.
7 Limitations
Because we identify Arabs based on name, our identification method would identify converts to
Islam who adopt a traditional Arab-Islamic name as Arabs, i.e. American Olympian Cassius Clay
changed his name to Muhammad Ali after converting to Islam. Although Pew Research finds that
21% of American-born Muslims are converts, it is unclear what percentage of converts change their
name as this is not required by Islam.23 To the extent homeowners react to Arab neighbors and not
Muslim neighbors, this measurement error in the identifier would certainly bias our results towards
0. However, to the extent that homeowners react to Muslim neighbors and not only Arab neighbors,
the results we report could be interpreted as a response to the presence of Muslim neighbors.
In addition, we identify Arabs using transaction data and can not identify Arab renters. To
the best of our knowledge, the only way to remedy this is to obtain information on the identity of
individual renters in the market. In order to mitigate the effect of potential Arab renters in nearby
multifamily properties, we present results in the appendix after removing properties less than 0.3mi
from a multifamily property that are similar to results in Table 6. Unfortunately, King County does
not include the the mailing address of the owner of record. Were this data available going back to
1982, we could do a similar procedure where we removed all properties less than 0.3mi from a non
22We were not able to identify any mosque or Islamic center closures post 9/11 in a web search and cannot rule out




owner-occupied property. If we assume that all non owner-occupied properties are rented out, this
would effectively remove all rental properties from the analysis. In any event, we fully acknowledge
this limitation as a limitation of all studies that use names in order to identify relevant ethnic or
religious types.
8 Conclusion
This study uses transaction data and presents evidence that 9/11 caused a change in homeowner
perceptions of Arab neighbors. Specifically, homeowners with Arab neighbors within 0.1mi sold
their properties at a 1.4% discount within 180 days of 9/11. A notable limitation of this study and
other comparable studies is that we cannot identify the source of the price declines. Specifically,
we cannot disentangle homeowner preferences for Arab neighbors from homeowner expectations of
the preferences of potential buyers.
In order to identify ethnicity, we use a supervised learning algorithm trained using Summer
Olympic rosters from 1948 to 2012. The algorithm can be used to classify buyer and seller names
for various groups in large data sets where manual classification is not possible. In future work, we
plan to compare our classifier to manual, crowd-sourced classifiers including the Amazon Mechanical
Turk.24 However, given the non-negligible costs associated with Amazon Mechanical Turk, we
reserve this for future work.
Our identification scheme is comparable to identification in other studies that use well-chosen
geographic identifiers in the absence of explicit ethnic or religious data. Not surprisingly, ethnic
groups with no apparent ties to the events of 9/11 do not appear to be the source of any significant
price effects. Using Arab League countries alone or alongside additional predominantly Muslim
countries yields more intense price effects. We also demonstrate that relying on geography alone
can yield misleading classifications that reduce both the estimated price effect and its significance.
That being said, we conclude that researchers must make judicious choices when creating relevant
country lists.
In any event, results indicate that preferences for specific ethnic groups can be changed by
significant events. Although we document a negative change in preferences, we are hopeful that
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Table 1: 20 Most Frequent Arab League and Non-Arab League Names
Arab League Non-Arab League
Name Count Name Count
mohamed 557 peter 920
al- 520 jose 864
el- 452 john 859
ahmed 230 de 817
abdel 186 kim 795
ali 180 van 748
ibrahim 102 david 620
ben 101 juan 581
hassan 81 maria 580
sayed 79 carlos 542
abdul 76 lee 540
mahmoud 75 paul 533
abdullah 71 michael 507
khaled 60 robert 492
moustafa 59 luis 479
youssef 55 martin 451
omar 49 jan 438
hussain 48 daniel 407
saleh 47 aleksandr 395
said 42 jean- 393
Table 1 displays the total counts for each name for Arab League and non Arab League countries.
Names are taken from Summer Olympic rosters 1948-2102. There are 90,636 Summer Olympians
from 221 countries.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Transaction Data
Statistic Min Mean Median Max St. Dev.
Sale Price in $1,000s 45.000 217.418 182.000 1,700.000 136.840
Square Footage 480 1,960.371 1,860 4,850 756.511
Construction Year 1900 1965.219 1969 2002 26.076
Age (years) 0 30.195 25 102 26.137
Bedrooms 1 3.316 3 6 0.840
Bathrooms 1 1.450 1 3 0.573
Sale Year 1982 1995.414 1996 2002 4.785
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the 265,255 transactions in the King County Assessor’s
data.
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Table 3: Control and Treatment Counts Pre and Post 9/11
Post = 0 Post = 1 Row Sum
D0.1 = 1 6,875 445 7,320
D0.3(1−D0.1) = 1 33,725 2,043 35,768
Column Sum 40,600 2,488 43,088
Table 3 displays the total number of transactions near Arab neighbors, before and after 9/11. The
variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days after 9/11.
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Table 4: Control Variables in the Treatment and Control Group
Variable Mean Treatment Mean Control t-statistic p-value
log(sqft) 7.495 7.484 2.23 0.026
Bedrooms 3.332 3.309 2.125 0.034
Bathrooms 1.546 1.478 -8.727 0.00
Construction Year 1969.769 1966.047 10.327 0 .00
Table 4 presents t-statistics for the differnece in means of the control variables for transactions
in the control group to transactions in the treatment group. The control group are transaction
0.1-0.3 miles from an Arab homeowner. The treatment group are transactions within 0.1mi of an
Arab homeowner. There are 33,014 transactions in the control group and 6,910 transactions in the
treatment group. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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Table 5: Strong Predictors from the Penalized Logistic Model
Arab League Non-Arab League
Name φ∗ Count Name φ∗ Count
fouad 9.838 18 diouf -8.301 13
salem 9.091 34 akhtar -8.262 14
khalifa 8.963 27 carolyn -7.325 20
khaled 8.961 61 teodoro -6.416 13
mourad 8.713 14 kerstin -6.311 48
nabil 8.696 21 patrick -6.124 196
hicham 8.462 17 hernan -6.058 31
kamel 8.397 27 ud- -6.008 22
riadh 8.077 11 cedric -5.806 31
fawzi 8.027 12 diop -5.604 19
yahia 7.905 11 khan -5.54 57
jamal 7.894 16 singh -5.287 359
ramadan 7.878 18 abdoulaye -5.175 18
khamis 7.862 24 nunez -5.16 32
tarek 7.73 17 keita -5.14 24
younes 7.671 12 reza -5.137 47
abou 7.599 20 eddie -5.075 53
adel 7.481 29 larry -4.613 62
alaa 7.321 12 filho -4.506 40
gamal 7.242 14 syed -4.301 20
Table 5 displays the 20 names that are the strongest predictors of being from an Arab League
and the 20 names that are the strongest predictors of not being from an Arab League country. φ∗
minimizes the `1 penalized likelihood model in Equation 2. The probability of being from an Arab








. Counts indicate the total number
of times a given name is found in the Olympic rosters from 1948-2012.
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Table 6: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors post 9/11
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.011∗∗ −0.006 −0.010 −0.006∗∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
D0.3 −0.000 −0.005 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.005
(0.005)
D0.1 × Post −0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.005 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
D0.3 × Post 0.009∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.013∗∗∗
(0.002)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.852 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 6 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab neighbors following September
11, 2001. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab
homeowner. The variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days
after September 11, 2001. All regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and
construction year as control variables. All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to
December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors clustered at the census tract and quarter
levels.
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Table 7: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors post 9/11, Alternative Specifications
Base Distance
≤ 0.5
Bins Distance Time Seasonal
D0.1 −0.006 −0.008 −0.011 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
D0.3 −0.005 0.003 −0.000 −0.005 −0.0005 −0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
D0.1 × 0.1−Distance0.1 0.000
(0.003)
D0.1 × Post −0.014∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.021∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004)
D0.3 × Post −0.013∗∗∗ −0.008 0.009∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗




D0.1 × Post× Days180 0.014
∗∗∗
(0.001)
Num. obs. 302,065 89,049 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.879 0.862 0.883 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X X X












∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 7 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab neighbors following September 11, 2001.
The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001.
The variable Distance is the distance between the property and the nearest Arab homeowner. The variable
Days is the number of days since September 11, 2001. The Base model uses all transactions since 1980. The
Distance model uses all transactions within 0.5mi of any Arab homeowner at any point in time. The Bins
model uses indicator variables for square footage binned every 500 square feet as well as indicator variables
for bedrooms, bathrooms. The Distance model allows the price effect to vary with Distance. The Time
model allows the price effect to vary with Days. The Seasonal model includes quarter fixed effects for Q2,
Q3, and Q4. All regressions except the Bins model include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and
construction year as control variables. All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31,
2002. All regressions use standard errors clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
36






D0.1 −0.006 −0.004 −0.016∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
D0.3 −0.0005 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
D0.1 × Post −0.014∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.009∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
D0.3 × Post −0.013∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 8 displays results for the price effects attributable to neighbor types following September 11, 2001.
The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of a specific homeowner type.
The variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001.
Base uses the Arab League as the identifying countries. EastAsian uses China, Korea, and Japan as the
identifying countries. Hispanic uses Mexico, Spain, and all Latin and South American countries as the
identifying countries. Expanded uses Arab League countries, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey as the identifying countries. MENA uses the Middle Eastern and North African countries as defined
in the US Census. All regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as
control variables. All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31, 2002. All regressions
use standard errors clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table 9: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors and Mosques post 9/11
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.016∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
D0.3 −0.003∗∗ −0.009 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.3 × (1−D0.1) −0.009
(0.006)
M0.1 0.006 0.001 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002
(0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
M0.3 −0.036∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.025) (0.006) (0.006)
M0.1 × (1−M0.3) −0.033
(0.025)
D0.1 × Post −0.021∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.004 0.002
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
D0.3 × Post 0.012∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010 0.003
(0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
M0.1 × Post −0.114∗∗ −0.013 −0.011 0.047 0.050
(0.052) (0.017) (0.009) (0.040) (0.040)
M0.3 × Post 0.038∗∗ 0.003 −0.037 −0.038
(0.017) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033)
M0.1 × (1−M0.3)× Post 0.003
(0.023)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.852 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X
Post 9/11 Window 0-180 Days 0-180 Days 0-180 Days 180-365 Days -180-0 Days
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 9 displays results for the time-varying effect of Arab neighbors and mosques following September 11,
2000. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The
variable M0.1 = 1 (M0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of a Mosque or Islamic Center. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001. All
regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All
regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors
clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Figure 1: Price Gradient Near Arab Homeowners

































Before Septermber 11 After Septermber 11
Figure 1 displays a local polynomial estimation of hedonic residuals less than 0.3 miles from an Arab neighbor
as a function of distance from the nearest Arab neighbor. The 95% confidence interval for transactions 0-180
days before 9/11 is presented in green, and the point estimates for transactions 0-180 days after 9/11 are
displayed in red.
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Figure 2: Treatment Area and Control Area
Arab Homeowner
distance < 0.1mi
0.1mi < distance < 0.3mi
0.3mi < distance
Figure 2 displays an example of a random property, properties less than 0.1 miles, properties 0.1-0.3 miles,
and properties more than 0.3 miles away.
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Figure 3 displays the 300 most frequent names on the Olympic rosters for each country. More frequent
names are indicated with a larger font.
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Figure 4: Location of Arab Homeowners
Arab Homeowners
Non-Arab Sales within 0.1mi
Mosque and 0.3mi Radius
Figure 4 displays a significant area of the study area in the vicinity of Seattle, Washington. Figure 4 displays
Arab homeowners on 9/11, transactions by Non-Arab homeowners within 0.1 miles of an Arab neighbor
0-180 days after 9/11, and mosques with a 0.3 mile radius.
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Distance < 0.1mi 0.1mi < Distance < 0.3mi Overlap
Figure 5 displays histograms of the control variables used in the hedonic regressions for transactions in
the control and treatment group. The control group includes all transactions 0.1-0.3 miles from an Arab
neighbor, and the treatment group includes all transactions less than 0.1 miles from an Arab neighbor.
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Figure 6: Logit Coefficients and Relative Frequency



























Figure 6 displays the coefficients of φ∗ relative to the log of the relative frequencies of names between the Arab
Leage and non Arab League countries. φ∗ is the set of coefficients that minimize the penalized liklelihood
in Equation 2. The number of times name p is found in the full names of Olympians from group g, Ng(p),
divided by the total number of Olympians in group g, Ng. The relative frequency for name p in group g is
equal to fg(p) =
Ng(p)
Ng
. The log relative frequency is equal to log(fArabLeague(p))− log(fNonArabLeague(p)).
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Figure 7 presents the quarterly hedonic price index for the treatment, control, and allsales sample of sales.
The treatment group is the set of all sales within 0.1mi of an Arab neighbor. The control group is the set
of all sales 0.1-0.3mi from an Arab neighbor. The allsales sample is the set of transactions in the data.
Quarters begin on the 11th of March, June, September, and December. The period t = 0 corresponds to the
period June 12, 2001 - September 10, 2001; t = 1 corresponds to the period September 11, 2001 - December
10, 2001. The index is normalized to 100 in the period 11 quarters before September 11, 2001.
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Figure 8: Alternative Ethnic Group Price Gradients
East Asian Homeowners






































Before Septermber 11 After Septermber 11
Hispanic Homeowners































Before Septermber 11 After Septermber 11
Figure 8 displays a local polynomial estimation of hedonic residuals from transactions less than 0.1 miles
from East Asian and Hispanic neighbor as a function of distance from the nearest East Asian or Hispanic
neighbor. The 95% confidence interval for transactions 0-180 days before 9/11 is presented in green, and the
point estimates for transactions 0-180 days after 9/11 are displayed in red.
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0 2 4 6 8 10
Post 9/11
95% Confidence Interval
Figure 9 presents the probability mass function of pairwise distances for each Arab homeowner in the data
before and after 9/11. Distances are grouped into 0.25mi bins. Confidence intervals are calculated using




1. Remove all transactions with sale prices less than the 0.5% quantile and sale prices greater than the
99.5% quantile of sale prices
2. Remove all transactions with square footage less than the 0.5% quantile of square footage and sale
prices greater than the 99.5% quantile of square footage
3. Remove all transactions with more than 6 bedrooms
4. Remove all transactions with more than 3 bathrooms
5. Remove all transactions for properties constructed before 1900
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Table A1: Countries and Types
Country Arab League Expanded MENA East Asian Hispanic
algeria X X X
argentina X




















iraq X X X
israel X
japan X
jordan X X X
kuwait X X X
lebanon X X X
libya X X X
mauritania X X
mexico X
morocco X X X
nicaragua X
north korea X
oman X X X
pakistan X




qatar X X X





syria X X X
tunisia X X X
turkey X
united arab emirates X X X
united arab republic X X X
uruguay X
venezuela X
yemen X X X
Table A1 lists the countries in the Arab League, the Arab League as well as countries with a significant
number and percentage of Muslim citizens, Middle East and North Africa countries as defined by the US
Census. We also include countries we define as East Asian and Hispanic.
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Table A2: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors post 9/11, 1990-2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.011∗∗ −0.006 −0.011 −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
D0.3 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.005
(0.005)
D0.1 × Post −0.018∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.002 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
D0.3 × Post 0.009∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
Num. obs. 262,601 262,601 262,601 262,601 262,601
R2 0.827 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A2 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab neighbors following September 11, 2001.
The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001. All
regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All
regressions use all transactions January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors
clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A3: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors post 9/11, 2000-2002
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.003 −0.002 −0.011 −0.004 −0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
D0.3 −0.012∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.009∗
(0.005)
D0.1 × Post −0.015∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
D0.3 × Post 0.004 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
Num. obs. 69,431 69,431 69,431 69,431 69,431
R2 0.803 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.820
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A3 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab neighbors following September 11, 2001.
The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001. All
regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All
regressions use all transactions January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors
clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A4: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors post 9/11, Cutoff 0.5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.008 −0.004 −0.009 −0.005 −0.005∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
D0.3 −0.003 −0.005 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.005
(0.006)
D0.1 × Post −0.021∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.002 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
D0.3 × Post 0.012∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.852 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A4 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab neighbors following September 11, 2001.
Arab neighbors are identified using a 0.5 probability cutoff. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction
is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-
90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001. All regressions include log square footage, bedrooms,
bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982
to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A5: Price Effects for East Asian Neighbors post 9/11
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.006∗∗ −0.004 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
D0.3 −0.008∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.010∗∗∗
(0.004)
D0.1 × Post −0.004 0.001 −0.019∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
D0.3 × Post 0.017∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.852 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A5 displays results for the price effects attributable to East Asian neighbors following September 11,
2001. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an East Asian homeowner.
The variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001.
All regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables.
All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors
clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A6: Price Effects for Hispanic Neighbors post 9/11
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
D0.3 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
D0.1 × Post −0.001 0.001 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.005 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
D0.3 × Post −0.000 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.009
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.022∗∗∗
(0.003)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.853 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A6 displays results for the price effects attributable to Hispanic neighbors following September 11,
2001. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Hispanic homeowner.
The variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001.
All regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables.
All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors
clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A7: Price Effects for Arab and Expanded Neighbors post 9/11
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
D0.3 0.003 −0.005 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.005
(0.007)
D0.1 × Post −0.041∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
D0.3 × Post 0.002 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.853 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A7 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab, Indonesian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turk-
ish, or Iranian neighbors following September 11, 2001. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is
within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab, Indonesian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish, or Iranian homeowner. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001. All
regressions include log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All
regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors
clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A8: Price Effects for Middle East and North African Neighbors post 9/11
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.008∗∗ −0.005 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.3 −0.003 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.012∗∗∗
(0.005)
D0.1 × Post −0.014∗∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.011 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
D0.3 × Post 0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
Num. obs. 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065 302,065
R2 0.853 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A8 displays results for the price effects attributable to Middle East and North African neighbors
following September 11, 2001. The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi)
of an Middle East and North African homeowner. The variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days,
0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001. All regressions include log square footage, bedrooms,
bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All regressions use all transactions January 1, 1982
to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors clustered at the census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A9: Price Effects for Arab Neighbors post 9/11, No Nearby Multifamily Properties
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
D0.1 −0.013∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.015∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
D0.3 −0.003 −0.007 −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3) −0.007
(0.005)
D0.1 × Post −0.012∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010)
D0.3 × Post 0.005∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
D0.1 × (1−D0.3)× Post −0.015∗∗∗
(0.002)
Num. obs. 250636 250636 250636 250636 250636
R2 (full model) 0.860 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888
Tract + Quarter FE X
Tract × Quarter FE X X X X










∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table A9 displays results for the price effects attributable to Arab neighbors following September 11, 2001.
The variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of an Arab homeowner. The
variable Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days, 0-90 days, or 180-365 days after September 11, 2001.
All single-family property less than 0.1mi from a multifamily property are removed. All regressions include
log square footage, bedrooms, bathrooms, and construction year as control variables. All regressions use
all transactions January 1, 1982 to December 31, 2002. All regressions use standard errors clustered at the
census tract and quarter levels.
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Table A10: Control and Treatment Counts Pre and Post 9/11, all Types
Panel A: East Asian
Post = 0 Post = 1 Row Sum
D0.1 = 1 59,772 2,934 62,706
D0.3(1−D0.1) = 1 99,767 4,246 104,013
Column Sum 159,539 7,180 166,719
Panel B: Hispanic
Post = 0 Post = 1 Row Sum
D0.1 = 1 78,510 4,071 82,581
D0.3(1−D0.1) = 1 111,962 3,861 115,82
Column Sum 190,472 7,932 198,404
Panel C: Expanded Arab League
Post = 0 Post = 1 Row Sum
D0.1 = 1 13,240 828 14,068
D0.3(1−D0.1) = 1 54,003 3,186 57,179
Column Sum 67,243 4,014 71,257
Panel D: Middle East and North Africa
Post = 0 Post = 1 Row Sum
D0.1 = 1 12,042 741 12,783
D0.3(1−D0.1) = 1 49,900 2,955 52,855
Column Sum 61,942 3,696 65,638
Table A10 displays the total number of transactions near various neighbor types, before and after 9/11. The
variable D0.1 = 1 (D0.3=1) if the transaction is within 0.1mi (0.3mi) of a given neighbor type. The variable
Post = 1 if the transaction is 0-180 days after 9/11.
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Figure A1 presents the Federal Housing Finance Administration house price index for King County, Wash-
ington. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and U.S. Federal Housing Finance Administration.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ATNHPIUS53033A
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